Showing posts with label CRS Reports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CRS Reports. Show all posts

Thursday, July 9, 2026

Update on Sec. 301 Tariff Actions

On July 2, 2026, the Congressional Research Service published IF 11346, "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."

Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301-310, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420), titled "Relief from Unfair Trade Practices," is often collectively referred to as "Section 301." Under Section 301, Congress grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and take action (e.g., impose a tariff) to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements or respond to certain foreign trade practices. As of June 2026, the second Trump Administration has initiated six investigations; four are ongoing and two investigations were completed in June 2026.

Tuesday, June 2, 2026

Made in China 2025 and China’s Industrial Policies

On June 2, 2026, the Congressional Research Service published Made in China 2025 and China’s Industrial Policies (IF10964). The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) aims to gain a global economic and technology leadership position through a range of industrial and science and technology (S&T) plans. Such plans inform PRC economic, industrial, S&T, and foreign trade and investment policies. They also guide PRC government and corporate strategies and activities at the national, local, and global levels. The industries, projects, and technologies featured in the plans reflect co-developed PRC civilian and military priorities that are to receive preferential financial and policy support. PRC plans and related policies feature a heavy government role in directing and funding PRC firms to acquire foreign technology and related capabilities in areas in which China has gaps and the United States has long been a global leader and has strong comparative advantages. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that PRC policies, if successful, could undermine U.S. technological leadership; further shift advanced technology, production, and research to China; and support China's advancements, including in defense. The scope and scale of PRC efforts are evident in the amount of state direction and support devoted to these efforts; PRC policies to lead in all parts of global supply chains; and the targeting of foreign capabilities.

China's Industrial Policy Approaches

Tax, trade, and investment measures. China uses tax preferences to incentivize foreign firms to invest in production and R&D. China introduces market access restrictions as domestic products become viable. China uses standards, IP, competition, and procurement policies to facilitate the transfer of foreign production and know-how to China and to require the use of PRC suppliers.

Forced JVs and partnerships. China's formal regulations and informal practices require a foreign firm to partner with a PRC entity to operate in China and drive foreign firms into JVs. In many sectors (e.g., aerospace), China leverages its role as a major purchaser to press for JVs and technology transfer in order to develop indigenous capabilities. In most cases, the foreign firm's partner is a state firm or the PRC government.

Government subsidies. PRC government guidance funds (GGFs) channel state funding to PRC firms for domestic R&D and overseas acquisitions. GGFs often take a stake or board seat in firms they fund and can influence corporate decisionmaking.

Foreign acquisitions. GGFs target and fund acquisitions of foreign firms and use foreign firms' expertise, IP, talent pools, and business networks to build China's capabilities.

Technology licensing and equipment. Foreign technology and equipment fill key gaps in China's current capabilities. PRC firms are members of U.S.-led open-source technology platforms (e.g., RISC-V, the Open Compute Project, the O-RAN Alliance).

Talent recruitment and training. China encourages the return of PRC expatriates and the hiring of foreign talent. Many PRC technology firms have U.S. R&D centers. Many PRC nationals participate in U.S. federally funded research in areas that overlap with MIC2025 technologies.

Sunday, May 10, 2026

The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress

The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.), as amended, confers upon the President a broad set of authorities to influence domestic industry in the interest of national defense. The authorities can be used across the federal government to shape the domestic industrial base so that, when called upon, it is capable of providing essential materials and goods needed for the national defense.

Though initially passed in response to the Korean War, the DPA is historically based on the War Powers Acts of World War II. Gradually, Congress has expanded the term national defense, as defined in the DPA. Based on this definition, the scope of DPA authorities now extends beyond shaping U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, as the authorities may also be used to enhance and support domestic preparedness, response, and recovery from natural hazards, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies.

Title III: Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply, allows the President to incentivize the domestic industrial base to expand the production and supply of critical materials and goods. Authorized incentives include loans, loan guarantees, direct purchases and purchase commitments, and the authority to procure and install equipment in private industrial facilities.

See: CRS Report 42767 (October 6,2023).

Thursday, April 30, 2026

Reminder to the Trade: Rules of Origin

Rules of origin (ROO) are laws, regulations, and procedures used for ascertaining the country of origin of imported products. ROO are important for assessing tariffs, enforcing U.S. trade laws, establishing eligibility for trade preference programs and free trade agreements (FTAs), and more. ROO may be a policy tool to shape global supply chains, incentivize manufacturing in certain countries, and address issues such as tariff evasion. Historically, Congress has created ROO for specific products and trade preference programs as well as shaped ROO in FTAs through consultation with the executive branch and approved those ROOs through implementing legislation.

See: Congressional Research Service publication IF10754.

Monday, April 20, 2026

BACKGROUND to IEEPA Tariffs and Sec. 122 Tariffs

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the imposition of tariffs. Later that same day, President Trump announced that he was imposing a temporary 10% surcharge on imports using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132). This is the first time a President has used Section 122.

Section 122 authorizes the President to impose temporary import duties or surcharges "[w]henever fundamental international payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports (1) to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits, (2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets, or (3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium." President Trump's actions have raised questions about the meaning of the term "balance-of-payments deficits" as it is used in Section 122.

Extending the Tariffs. Section 122 authorizes a surcharge for up to 150 days "unless such period is extended by Act of Congress." Congress could consider legislation to extend (or terminate) the surcharge proclaimed by President Trump, although Section 122 does not provide expedited procedures for considering such legislation.

Amending Section 122. If Congress approves or disapproves of Section 122 duties and does not wish to wait for or defer to courts' interpretations of the statute, it could either amend Section 122 or pursue nonbinding measures (such as a simple resolution) to express whether it thinks Section 122's conditions for tariffs are currently satisfied.

See: Proclamation 11012 of February 20, 2026

See: Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.

See: CRS Report IF13199.

` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., two appeals concerning tariffs President Trump had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that IEEPA does not give the President authority to impose tariffs.

See: CRS Report LSB11398.

` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

On April 2, 2025, President Trump declared a separate emergency concerning "a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships . . . as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits." Based on this declaration, President Trump invoked IEEPA to announce tariffs of at least 10% on imports from almost all U.S. trading partners and higher, country-specific "reciprocal tariffs" for many countries (collectively, the worldwide tariffs). President Trump subsequently modified the trafficking tariffs and the worldwide tariffs several times. The President also cited IEEPA when imposing tariffs on imports from Brazil, India, and various other imports based on emergency declarations.

See: Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `

On February 1, 2025, President Donald Trump invoked IEEPA to announce tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the PRC, declaring emergencies largely concerning illicit drugs (the trafficking tariffs).

Executive Order 14193 imposed additional tariff of 25% on products of Canada, effective February 4, 2025.

See: Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border.

Executive Order 14194 imposed additional tariff of 25% on products of Mexico, effective February 4, 2025.

See: Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border

Executive Order 14195 imposed additional tariff of 10% on products PRC, effective February 4, 2025.

See: Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025 Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China

AVAILABLE NOW – Processing of IEEPA Refunds IMPORTANT

April 20, 2026, CSMS # 68396594 - AVAILABLE NOW – Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) for IEEPA Refunds.

See: International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Duty Refunds.

On April 20, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the first phase of the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) tool in the Automated Commercial Environment Secure Data Portal (ACE Portal). CAPE will simplify International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) duty refund requests made pursuant to court order and in accordance with appropriate statutory authority by providing an electronic pathway to submit valid IEEPA duty refund claims.

CAPE is designed to consolidate refunds of IEEPA duties including interest rather than processing refunds on an entry-by-entry basis. CBP plans to implement CAPE through a phased development approach, adding more functionality in subsequent phases for more complicated scenarios. CAPE Phase 1 is limited to certain unliquidated entries and certain entries within 80 days of liquidation.

NOTE: Per CBP’s practice, liquidation typically occurs automatically 314 days after entry.

See: CRS Report IF13150.

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

Cyber and Artificial Intelligence Provisions in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

The Congressional Research Service released IF13197 Cyber and Artificial Intelligence Provisions in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (FY2026 NDAA; P.L. 119-60) contains numerous provisions regarding cyber-related issues, including artificial intelligence (AI). Title XV organizes Cyberspace-Related Matters into five subtitles: A. Operations; B. Cybersecurity; C. Information Technology and Data Management; D. Artificial Intelligence; and E. Reports and Other Matters. Other titles in the FY2026 NDAA contain provisions directly or indirectly related to cyberspace and AI. This In Focus describes selected elements of these and other selected provisions and potential issues for Congress.

Monday, March 16, 2026

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

March 13, 2026, the Congressional Research Service published an updated version report "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."

Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301-310, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420), titled "Relief from Unfair Trade Practices," is often collectively referred to as "Section 301." Under Section 301, Congress grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and take action (e.g., impose a tariff) to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements and respond to certain foreign trade practices. As of March 2026, there are four ongoing investigations under Section 301. In 2025, the second Trump Administration initiated investigations related to various practices by Brazil and the implementation of the commitments made under the "Phase One" agreement by the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China). In 2026, the Administration initiated two investigations into excess industrial capacity (14 countries and the European Union) and action on forced labor practices (59 countries and the European Union). Tariffs on imports from China imposed in 2018 under Section 301 during the first Trump Administration remain in effect.

The 119th Congress could consider the effectiveness of USTR's Section 301 actions in deterring certain foreign trade practices, the impact of actions taken under Section 301 on the U.S. economy, and whether the authorities are being used in the way Congress intends.

Read more HERE.

Friday, February 27, 2026

U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

February 26, 2026, the Congressional Research Service published an updated version of the CRS publication "U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview" (IF12990).

Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the stated intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies.

Monday, February 23, 2026

What is AGOA?

What is AGOA? The African Growth and Opportunity Act (P.L. 106-200, as amended) created a nonreciprocal U.S. trade preference program, also referred to as AGOA, to provide duty-free access to the U.S. market for most exports from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The act also requires an annual U.S.-SSA consultative forum to discuss trade-related issues and AGOA implementation. Additionally, AGOA provides direction to selected U.S. government agencies regarding their trade and investment support activities in the region. AGOA has been a cornerstone of U.S. trade policy toward SSA since 2000. Through AGOA, Congress seeks to increase U.S.-SSA trade and investment ties, promote economic growth through trade, and encourage the rule of law and market-oriented reforms. Congress may renew the program, which is scheduled to expire in December 2026 following a one-year extension (P.L. 119-75), and modify the program to promote other priorities in the region, such as strengthening U.S. trade and investment ties with SSA and increasing regional participation in global value chains.Authorization. Congress established AGOA in 2000, and has extended and modified the program several times. Most recently, Section 5019, Division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) reauthorized AGOA through December 2026 and retroactively extended duty-free benefits from September 2025 when the previous authorization expired. AGOA was last amended under the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Millennium Challenge Act Modernization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-167), which required the Administration to provide information on AGOA via an official website; promote AGOA utilization by beneficiaries and export diversification under AGOA; support regional trade facilitation; and educate African entrepreneurs on U.S. counterterrorism policies.

Apparel and Third-Country Fabric Provision. AGOA's duty-free treatment of certain apparel products is significant because apparel articles (1) face relatively high U.S. tariffs; (2) are mostly excluded from GSP; and (3) can be readily manufactured in developing countries as their production requires relatively limited skilled labor and capital investment. Production in this sector can be a first-step toward higher value-added manufacturing. The third-country fabric provision in AGOA is a major factor enabling AGOA countries' competitiveness in the sector. This provision extends AGOA duty-free benefits to limited amounts of U.S. apparel imports from least-developed SSA countries even if the yarns and fabrics used in their production are sourced from non-AGOA countries (e.g., apparel assembled in Kenya with China-sourced fabrics can qualify for duty-free treatment under AGOA).

Read more HERE.

Friday, February 13, 2026

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

Title III of the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 301-310, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420), titled "Relief from Unfair Trade Practices," is often collectively referred to as "Section 301." Under Section 301, Congress grants the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) a range of responsibilities and authorities to investigate and take action (e.g., impose a tariff) to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements and respond to certain foreign trade practices. There are two ongoing investigations under Section 301 related to various practices by Brazil and the implementation of the commitments made under the "Phase One" agreement by the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China). USTR recently concluded investigations into PRC shipping practices, PRC semiconductor practices, and labor and human rights practices in Nicaragua. Tariffs on imports from China imposed in 2018 under Section 301 during the first Trump Administration remain in effect.

The 119th Congress could consider the effectiveness of USTR's Section 301 actions in deterring certain foreign trade practices, the impact of actions taken under Section 301 on the U.S. economy, and whether the authorities are being used in the way Congress intends.

From the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 until the first Trump Administration, the United States used Section 301 primarily to build cases and pursue dispute settlement at the WTO. The first Trump Administration investigated foreign trade practices under Section 301 six times. Two investigations into China and the European Union (EU) resulted in the imposition of tariffs. In 2020, USTR imposed tariffs on imports from the EU under Section 301 based on the findings of a WTO dispute settlement body decision on EU subsidies on civil aircraft. Those tariffs were suspended in 2021.

Following a 2017 investigation into PRC practices related to forced technology transfer, intellectual property rights, and innovation, in 2018 USTR imposed tariffs ranging from 7.5% to 25% on around $370 billion worth of U.S. imports from China. In May 2024, under the Biden Administration, USTR concluded the statutory four-year review of Section 301 actions and their impact on the U.S. economy. Following the review, USTR maintained existing tariffs and increased tariffs on certain products (e.g., electric vehicles).

In 2024, the Biden Administration initiated three investigations under Section 301 that were completed in 2025. In each case, USTR determined that the policies under investigation were actionable under Section 301 but has not implemented actions that would increase tariffs or other import restrictions. Investigations into labor and human rights practices in Nicaragua (see text box) and PRC policies in the semiconductor industry, both initiated in December 2024, were determined to be actionable under Section 301 in late 2025 but resulted in no immediate additional tariffs. An investigation into PRC shipping and shipbuilding practices, initiated in April 2024, resulted in a January 2025 finding by the Biden Administration that PRC practices in this sector burden or restrict U.S. commerce, but proposed port fees and tariffs were suspended in 2025.

Read more HERE.

Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status

Since the beginning of his second term on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump has increased tariffs on U.S. imports from all global partners. To implement these tariffs, the President has cited authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). The Trump Administration has also initiated investigations under Section 232 which may result in additional sectoral tariffs. The Administration may also consider tariffs as a remedy for unfair trade practices under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-20).

Since announcing these tariff actions, the Administration has been in negotiations with some partners on tariff and nontariff matters, and some trade partners have announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. Between April and December 2025, the Administration released 12 joint statements regarding framework agreements with partners on tariff issues (including with the European Union, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and others) and also announced a series of temporary tariff truces with China. Negotiations with other partners are ongoing.

Table 1. Summary of U.S. Executive Tariff Actions

January 20, 2025-December 31, 2025

Description

Country Affected

Current Tariff Rate / Status

Actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, Table 2)

Fentanyl-related

Canada

35% on most goods; 10% on potash and Canadian energy; United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemption.

Fentanyl & Migration

Mexico

25% on most goods; 10% on potash; USMCA exemption.

Fentanyl-related

China

10% on all goods; ended de minimis duty-free treatment.

Venezuelan Oil

Designated

25% on all goods from countries designated by the Sec. of State.

Trade Deficit/ Reciprocal

Global

10%-41%, by country of origin, on most goods (with exceptions);

Paused: 125% on China.

Ending De Minimis Treatment

Global

Ended de minimis duty-free treatment.

Brazil's Government Policies

Brazil

40% on select goods (with exceptions).

Importing Russian Oil

India

25% on most goods (with exceptions).

Actions under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, Table 3 and Table 4)

Steel

Global

50% globally; 25% on imports from the United Kingdom (UK).

Aluminum

Global

50% globally; 25% on imports from the UK.

Automobiles & Parts

Global

25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU;* some USMCA exceptions.

Copper

Global

50% globally on semi-finished copper products.

Timber/Lumber

Global

10%-25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU.*

Trucks and Buses

Global

10% on buses globally; 25% on trucks and truck parts globally; some USMCA exceptions.

Semiconductors

TBD

Investigation initiated (April 2025).

Pharmaceuticals

TBD

Investigation initiated (April 2025).

Critical Minerals

TBD

Investigation initiated (April 2025).

Aircraft

TBD

Investigation initiated (May 2025).

Drones

TBD

Investigation initiated (July 2025).

Polysilicon

TBD

Investigation initiated (July 2025).

Wind Turbines

TBD

Investigation initiated (August 2025).

Robotics

TBD

Investigation initiated (September 2025).

Medical Equipment

TBD

Investigation initiated (September 2025).

Actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, Table 5)

China's Semiconductor Policies

China

Investigation completed. China's policies found actionable. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) proposed no additional tariffs in 2026, and a potential rate increase in June 2027.

China's Shipping Industries

China

Investigation completed. Action of port fees and tariffs suspended.

Nicaragua's Labor Rights

Nicaragua

Investigation completed. USTR proposes tariffs beginning in 2027.

Brazil's Trade Practices

Brazil

Investigation initiated (July 2025).

China's Phase One Agreement Compliance

China

Investigation initiated (October 2025).

Foreign Digital Services Taxes

TBD

President directed USTR to consider renewing past investigation.

International Seafood

TBD

President directed USTR to consider a new investigation.

Source: CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents.

Notes: TBD=to be determined. EU=European Union. Many 2025 tariff actions, with exceptions, are cumulative. Details may change due to bilateral trade deals not yet implemented or other policy changes. *For UK, EU, South Korea, and Japan, auto and timber rates include most-favored nation tariffs. UK auto rates include tariff-rate quota for vehicles.

Read more HERE.

Tuesday, September 16, 2025

U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

On August 28, 2025, the Congressional Research Service published U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview (IF 12990).

Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the stated intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies. Since January 2025, the Trump Administration's trade policy and tariff actions have maintained a focus on China among other countries. Some actions explicitly target China; others involve sectors that affect China. The PRC has responded to U.S. tariffs with its own tariffs and market restrictions. Given the trade imbalance (China exports to the United States more than four times what it imports), China has fewer goods on which to raise tariffs. China has focused its tariffs on top U.S. exports and canceled orders, implemented export controls on some production inputs, and imposed market restrictions on some U.S. firms. Both sides have exempted some products from tariffs. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration's approach to tariffs; whether to sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and whether to require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes.

Saturday, August 23, 2025

Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status: Helpful Summary and Tables

August 22, 2025, Congresssional Research Report R48549, Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status.

Since the beginning of his second term on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump has increased tariffs on U.S. imports from all global partners. To implement these tariffs, the President has cited authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). The Trump Administration has also initiated investigations under Section 232 which may result in additional sectoral tariffs. The Administration may also consider tariffs as a remedy for unfair trade practices under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-20).

Since announcing these tariff actions, the Administration has been in negotiations with some partners on tariff and nontariff matters, and some trade partners have announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. Between April and August 2025, the Administration reached framework agreements with the United Kingdom and the European Union, and a temporary tariff truce with China. In July 2025, the Administration also announced initial details of preliminary agreements with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. Some negotiations appear to have stalled (e.g., with Canada and India); other negotiations are ongoing (e.g., with Mexico and China). The conclusion of ongoing talks and the implementation of agreed terms may further alter the details of the tariff actions summarized in the following tables.

U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

Congressional Research Service Report IF 12990, U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview

Since 2018, the U.S. government has imposed a series of tariffs on imports from the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) with the v intention of addressing U.S. concerns about PRC trade practices and foreign policies. Since January 2025, the Trump Administration's trade policy and tariff actions have maintained a focus on China among other countries. Some actions explicitly target China; others involve sectors that affect China. The PRC has responded to U.S. tariffs with its own tariffs and market restrictions. Given the trade imbalance (China exports to the United States more than four times what it imports), China has fewer goods on which to raise tariffs. China has focused its tariffs on top U.S. exports and canceled orders, implemented export controls on some production inputs, and imposed market restrictions on some U.S. firms. Both sides have exempted some products from tariffs. Members of Congress may consider whether to support, modify, or oppose the Administration's approach to tariffs; whether to sustain, expand, or pull back trade authorities Congress delegated to the President; and whether to require approval by Congress for trade deals that result in tariff changes.

Tuesday, March 15, 2022

Clothing Top Category of Online Purchases, E-Commerce Has Fueled Growth of Counterfeiting

On March 14, 2022, the Congressional Research Service published International Trade and E-commerce.

In 2021, 79% of the U.S. population engaged in ecommerce, with clothing as the top category of online purchases

The growth of e-commerce platforms has helped fuel the growth of counterfeit and pirated goods. USTR’s annual Notorious Markets List reports on online markets engaged in facilitating trade in these goods. President Biden has ordered the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen customs enforcement to help prevent the import of counterfeit items ordered online.

Friday, March 26, 2021

Section 301 Tariffs on China: Analysis and Guidance

Section 301 Tariffs on China: Analysis and Guidance

 

prepared

 

March 23, 2021

 

by

 

David Trumbull, Agathon Associates

Glenn Page, Foreign Trade Zone Solutions LLC

 

The U.S. Section 301 tariffs on China have been a burden on many U.S. business since implemented by the Trump administration in 2018.  As a new administration settles in  Washington, the tariffs do not appear to be going away anytime soon. The good news is there are tariff mitigation strategies that can be employed to avoid or reduce the tariffs altogether.

 

China's history on employing unfair trade practices is well-established. Early in the Trump administration, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,(USTR) conducted an investigation concerning these unfair trade allegations by China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.  As a result of that investigation, it was discovered that China routinely engages in unfair trade acts and policies, utilizes cyber practices to steal U.S. intellectual property, and imposes grossly unfair innovation and technology transfer mandates upon U.S businesses operating in China.  To address those findings, the United States imposed tariffs on products from China. Many classes of merchandise were made subject to 25% Section 301 tariff. As of now, it appears the President Biden has no near-term plans to eliminate or modify the tariffs.

 

If your company imports from China and is incurring the 25% tariff, on top of the general rate of duty, you know, first-hand, that this tariff action, however well-intended and needed, is imposing considerable collateral damage on U.S. businesses. You probably have questions such as--

 

Will President Biden eliminate or modify the tariffs?

 

It appears that the Biden Administration agrees that the investigation under the previous Administration has established China's bad behavior and has justified the Section 301 tariff action. In the President's Trade Policy Agenda, released March 1, 2021, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative stated: "The Biden Administration is committed to using all available tools to take on the range of China’s unfair trade practices that continue to harm U.S. workers and businesses." Following her February 25, 2021, Senate hearing confirmation hearing Biden nominee for United States Trade Representative, Katherine Tai, stated the Biden Administration's commitment to "work with Congress to ensure that those tariffs are appropriately responsive to China's practices and consider the impact on U.S. businesses, workers and consumers."[1] Clearly, these are not the words on an Administration that plans to repudiate the China tariffs. However, it also appears to leave open the question of possible re-opening of the exclusion process, which allows for businesses to request from the USTR a waiver or removal of certain articles of merchandise that have been identified and targeted by the USTR for higher tariffs.  This can be accomplished by application to the USTR with a persuasive line of reasoning why certain items should be excluded from the Section 301.   

 

 

So far, the Biden Administration sole action relating to the China tariff was a notice on March 5, 2021[2], of the U.S. Trade Representative's determination to extend certain product exclusions on medical-care and/or COVID response products through September 30, 2021. Even in this action the Biden Administration was continuing the policy of the Trump Administration which on December 23, 2020[3], extended through those exclusions, set to expire December 31, 2020, through March 31, 2021.

 

 

Can I get the products I import off the list for tariffs?

 

At this time, there is no mechanism for removing classes of articles from the tariff action or excluding specific articles. The USTR received a total of 52,746 exclusion requests, of these, 6,804 (13%) were granted and 45,942 (87%) were denied.[4] The exclusion process was criticized by many for lack of transparency. Senator John Cornyn (Rep., Texas) asked USTR nominee Katherine Tai whether she would "consider reinstating the process for product exclusions and those that had previously received such exclusions?" Her reply was--

 

China's track record of using unfair practices to acquire U.S. technology, to the detriment of U.S. innovators and workers, is well-established. In the last administration, USTR conducted an investigation against unfair trade practices in China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and found that China engages in unfair trade acts policies and practices related to intellectual property, innovation and technology transfer. To address those findings, the United States imposed tariffs on products from China. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that those tariffs are appropriately responsive to China’s practices and consider the impact on U.S. businesses, workers and consumers.

 

 


Is there any other way I can get out from under this financial burden?

 

There are some strategies for mitigating Section 301 China tariffs. Please note that in the examples given below all reference to specific companies and their plans are based solely on public information; no business confidential information has been used in compiling these examples.

 

 

 

1.         Verify that the merchandise you import is subject to the tariff.

 

The Section 301 tariffs are applied based on the eight-digit classification of the merchandise in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"). The first thing we do for a client facing a Section 301 tariff is to determine whether they have been using the correct classification. we have helped clients avoid the tariff by establishing the correct classification. In a case where they have already paid the tariff due to misclassification it is often possible to get refund from Customs.

 

2.         Move a critical part out of China.

 

Getting out of China completely may not be an option. Investments and partnerships have been made. Re-creating factories and the rest of the supply chain in other country can be expensive and may take months or years. The good news is that it may not be necessary to get completely out of China to get out from under the China tariffs.

 

Determining the country of origin of merchandise is complex. The U.S. customs regulations make an important distinction between merchandise made in a particular country and merchandise merely assembled in a particular country. When components from two or more countries are assembled in one country, the country of assembly is not necessarily the country of origin. Rather, Customs may look to all the components that make up the finished article and determine what is the single component that defines what the article is. The origin of that one component may be the origin of the finished article, even if the last assembly operation was in China and used Chinese components.

 

An Example

 

On September 24, 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection determined the country of origin of Yamaha Motor Corporation, USA motorized bicycles assembled in China from components made in China, Japan, and Taiwan. The frame was made in Taiwan. CBP has consistently found that the essence of a bicycle is its frame. Therefore, CBP ruled that the country of origin of the Yamaha motorized bicycles was Taiwan, not subject to the China Section 301 tariff of 25% on motorized bicycles of classification 8711.60.0090, even though the bicycles were assembled in China and had substantial Chinese-origin content.[5]

 

3.         Get out of China

 

Some manufacturing does not require a large investment in plant and equipment and can be more easily relocated. For example, to produce hats and other head coverings of textile materials all you need is some sewing machines to assemble hats from cut fabric and machines to knit hats.

 

In 2018, prior to the Section 301 tariffs, China dominated U.S. imports of hats, accounting for 75% of all U.S. imports of hats. There were just six other nations that had at least one percent of the share, and the rest of the world, collectively, accounted for just two percent.

 

With the 25% Section 301 tariff in place in 2019, China dropped to 67%, Vietnam and Bangladesh each had significant growth, there were nine nations, in addition to China, that each had at least one percent of the trade, and the rest of the world grew to a collective three percent.

The year 2020 brought the pandemic and overall reduced demand for hats. The biggest loser was China, with dropped to 59% of all shipments. Trade further diversified, with 11 individual nations each accounting for at least one percent of trade, and the rest of the world, collectively, accounting for four percent.

 

Not only did the tariff on China diversify the import supply chain, but it also resulted in some hat production returning the U.S.

 

4.         File for an exclusion

 

As noted above, there is no exclusion process now. The former process, which is closed, was criticized for lack of transparency. It also resulted in an 87% denial rate. We filed requests relating to nine articles, three of which (33%) were approved. Should an opportunity for filing exclusions open, we shall be happy to discuss your potential petition.

 

5.         Establish a Foreign-Trade Zone ("FTZ")

 

An FTZ is a federally-designated physical location within the United States (including U.S. territories) which for Customs purposes, and Customs purposes only, is considered to be outside the Customs Territory of the U.S. When merchandise enters an FTZ no import duty is collection. Duty because due when the merchandise leaves the FTZ to enter the commerce of the U.S. That means that merchandise entered into an FTZ and subsequently re-exported (whether or not advanced in condition, never enters the Customs Territory of the U.S. and, therefore, is never subject to U.S. import duty[6].

 

An Example

 

On October 24, 2018, Panasonic Eco Solutions Solar New York America (PESSNY) submitted an application to the FTZ Board in Washington, D.C. for its facility in Buffalo, New York, where they manufacture crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, using imported silicon wafers and silver paste. These two materials to be used in the production of the solar cells are classifiable under 8-digit HTSUS subheadings included in the Federal Register Notice of September 21, 2018 published by the U.S. Trade Representative, which set a 25% tariff, in addition to regular tariffs, on these articles from China.

 

On April 2, 2019, PESSNY received approval from the FTZ Board. Now they can enter silicon wafers and silver paste into the FTZ and pay no import duty. When they subsequently export, they never pay the duty.

 

Financial details of PESSNY's savings are confidential, but the 2019 Annual Report of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to the Congress of the United States provides a range.

 

In 2019 PESSNY received into the FTZ $25 to $50 million of merchandise, of which $10 to $25 million was subsequently exported, and not subject to the 25% tariff on Chinese goods. Recall that they got FTZ approval after the first quarter of 2019; full-year savings may be even higher.

 

PESSNY also avoids duty on foreign-status components which become scrap/waste in the FTZ.

 

An initial analysis of your businesses’ import patterns is offered free of charge.  This preliminary assessment will allow us to determine the best strategy to utilize if it’s established your business can benefit from any of the above mentioned opportunities. Contact Glenn at glenn@foreigntradezonesolutions.com or David david@agathonassociates.com or by calling David at 617-285-6004 or Glenn at 603-957-8247.



[2] See 86 FR 13785, March 10, 2021.

[3] See 85 FR 85831, December 29, 2020.

[5] See in Binding Ruling Letter HQ H312767

[6] Note, there are restrictions regarding merchandise that has been advanced in condition and subsequently re-exported to Canada or Mexico.

Wednesday, February 17, 2021

Report Identifies Several Areas of Congressional Concern Regarding China

On February 16, 2021, the Congressional Research Service released U.S.-China Trade Relations.

The report identifies several areas of congressional concern, stating:

"China’s use of industrial policies, subsidies, and regulatory authorities (e.g., antitrust, procurement, and standards) to advance economic, technological, and military development goals are of concern to many in Congress. Policies such as Made in China 2025 aim to create competitive advantages for China in strategic industries, in part by first obtaining technology and expertise from U.S. firms to gain core competencies. These policies appear to incentivize technology transfer, licensing, and joint venture requirements; state-directed technology and intellectual property (IP) theft; and government-fundedacquisitions of U.S. companies. Also of concern is potentially widespread Chinese economic, academic, and cyber-enabled espionage—including reports of cyberattacks on U.S. universities and companies engaged in COVID-19 vaccine research—and China's military-civil fusion program, which seeks to leverage Made in China 2025 advancements for military applications. There is growing attention to how U.S. commercial ties may support China's behaviors of concern, including in Hong Kong and Xinjiang."

Wednesday, February 3, 2021

Condemning the coup in Myanmar: G7 Foreign Ministers' statement

The G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union, are united in condemning the coup in Myanmar.

“We are deeply concerned by the detention of political leaders and civil society activists, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and targeting of the media. We call upon the military to immediately end the state of emergency, restore power to the democratically-elected government, to release all those unjustly detained and to respect human rights and the rule of law. The November election results must be respected and Parliament should be convened at the earliest opportunity.

“The military’s restrictions on information flows are deeply concerning. Civilians, including civil society and the media, must not be subject to reprisals in any form. We also call for unrestricted humanitarian access to support the most vulnerable.

“G7 Foreign Ministers recall their 2019 communique in which we restated our commitment to Myanmar’s democratic transition, peace and accountability for human rights violations and abuses.

“We stand with the people of Myanmar who want to see a democratic future.”

Agathon Associates has followed developments in U.S. trade with Myanmar, also called Burma, for many years.

In 2013 the U.S. lifted the ban on imports from Burma, and in 2016 extended GSP benefits to Burma (GSP, or Generalized System of Preferences, is a program that provides for duty-free entry for certain articles from developing nations.

More information about Burma is available at this Congression Research Service report.

Friday, January 8, 2021

Congressional Research Service Reports on China 301 Exclusions

In a report released January 7, 2021, the Congressional Research Service presented its analysis of the Section 301 Tariff Exclusions on U.S. Imports from China. Through January 31, 2020, the USTR receiveda total of 52,746 exclusion requests, pertinent to all four actions. Of these, 6,804 (13%) were granted and 45,942 (87%) were denied. Specifically, the exclusions are reflected in 89 10-digit HTSUS tariff subheadings and 2,120 specially prepared product descriptions—all of which cover 6,804 separate requests. Because most exclusions apply to specific products within a relevant subheading—not to entire subheadings, CRS could not determinethe exact amount of trade covered by the exclusions.The USTR has also issued extensions to certain exclusions. They apply to 42 (of the 89) HTSUS subheadings and 507 (of the 2,120) specially prepared product descriptions. These extensions have expired or are set to expirein March 2021.